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Action 
Jessica A. Feil∗ 
Every country on the planet is constantly on the lookout 
for new strategies that will protect national security. The quest 
for new tools is as old as warfare itself. Hundreds of years ago, 
cannons were the height of technological development. Then 
improved guns, tanks, ships, and airplanes carrying missiles. 
Now the tools of national security seem to come straight from 
science fiction. American military and civilian national security 
agencies are frontrunners in developing cybertools that will help 
keep soldiers and operatives safe and provide a tactical 
advantage. These cyberweapons have been in development for 
decades. Some policymakers and academics call for new 
regulation or even prohibition of cyberweapons, both 
domestically and internationally. Such regulation would be 
short-sighted and reactionary. Cyberweapons offer significant 
range of utility. Properly written computer code ensures targets 
and goals are met accurately. New technologies offer precision 
unknown in previous weaponry. Cyberweapons are not the only 
new technology generating concern. Unmanned aerial vehicles 
are similarly critiqued. The American government has provided 
more expansive legal justifications for drone campaigns abroad. 
The public information available about drone campaigns sheds 
light on how cyberweapons will fit into the twenty-first century 
national security universe. 
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“But the fact of the matter is that cyber war is like Carl 
Sandburg’s fog. It comes in on little cat feet, and it’s hardly noticed. 
That’s its greatest potential.” 1 
                                                       – John Arquilla 
 
I. Introduction 
In 2010, the computer worm Stuxnet entered geopolitics by 
striking Iranian nuclear facilities.2 Stuxnet caused critical uranium 
enrichment centrifuges to spin too quickly and break, all while 
reporting no errors to the monitoring system.3 While this alone did 
not stop the Iranian nuclear weapon development program, it set it 
back at least a few months.4 A year later, Stuxnet spawned Duqu,5 a 
1. Interview with John Arquilla, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate 
School, PBS (Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/cyberwar/interviews/arquilla.html. Arquilla is a professor at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Arquilla has been at the forefront of 
cyberwar operations, including introducing such tactics in the First Gulf 
War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Id.  
2. William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Tests Called 
Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1. 
3. Id.  
4. Joby Warrick, Iran’s Nuclear Program Suffering New Setbacks 
Diplomats and Experts Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2011), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/irans-nuclear-pro 
gram-suffering-new-setbacks-diplomats-and-experts-say/2011/10/17/g 
IQAByndsL_story.html. 
5. Kim Zetter, Son of Stuxnet Found in the Wild on Systems in Europe, 
WIRED MAG. (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/thr 
eatlevel/2011/10/son-of-stuxnet-in-the-wild/.  
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Trojan6 bearing the same hallmarks of the Stuxnet code.7 The United 
States and Israel eventually admitted to developing and launching 
Stuxnet.8 In 2012, a computer security company identified Flame, 
which the United States and Israel also developed and launched prior 
to Stuxnet.9 Flame infiltrated computers, spying on computer files 
and user actions, and laid the foundation for the later Stuxnet 
attack.10 Two more computer viruses, Mahdi and Gauss, are currently 
spying on computers throughout the Middle East, including Iran.11 
A few years earlier, in 2008, a distributed denial of service attack 
(DDoS) struck and incapacitated the government websites of 
Georgia.12 The DDoS attack preceded Russia’s armed invasion of 
Georgia.13 Without government websites, communication was 
impossible, providing Russia a significant tactical advantage.14 A year 
earlier, a DDoS attack, again originating in Russia, crippled the 
internet infrastructure of Estonia.15 Estonia has a 97% high-speed 
internet penetration rate, so a disruption of access to web-based 
6. A Trojan is a program that steals data from the computers it infects 
and sends the data back to its originator. Jaikumar Vijaya, FAQ: What 
is the Big Deal About Duqu?, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 15, 2011), 
available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9221817/FAQ_ 
What_s_the_big_deal_about_Duqu_. 
7. Zetter, supra note 5.  
8. Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 2.  
9. Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller & Julie Tate, U.S., Israel Developed 
Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say, 
WASH. POST June 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wor 
ld/national-security/us-israel-developed-computer-virus-to-slow-iranian-
nuclear-efforts-officials-say/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV_story_1.html. 
10. Id. 
11. Kim Zetter, Mahdi, the Messiah, Found Infecting Systems in Iran, 
Israel, WIRED MAG. (July 17, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlev 
el/2012/07/mahdi/; Jim Finkle, Virus Found in Mideast Can Spy on 
Bank Transactions, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/08/09/cybersecurity-gauss-idINL2E8J92YD20120809. 
12. John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2008, at A1.  
13. Id. 
14. Id.  
15. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, 
WIRED MAG. (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security 
/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia?currentPage=all (stating that the impact of 
attacks was felt by “[a]ll major commercial banks, telcos, media outlets, 
and name servers . . . .”). 
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services was disastrous.16 In both cases, the Russian government 
denied responsibility.17  
These attacks are just some of the examples of the more 
successful and notorious cyber campaigns. There are countless 
cyberattacks around the globe everyday;18 the most sophisticated 
computer networks in the world are vulnerable. The U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) fends off thousands of cyberattacks on a daily 
basis.19 Despite the frequency of cyberattacks, there is no consensus as 
to when a cyberattack becomes cyberwar.20 Cyberwar is at the 
forefront of national security, making the need for a governing legal 
framework more urgent than ever.21  
16. Id. Estonia has one of the highest internet penetration rates in the world 
and extremely heavy reliance on this infrastructure. The entire 
government internet presence was offline, online banking and ATMs 
failed, newspapers websites were disconnected. There was virtually no 
means of conducting regular business. Id.  
17. Kim Hart, Longtime Battle Lines Are Recast in Russia and Georgia’s 
Cyberwar, WASH. POST Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303623_pf. 
html; A Cyber-Riot, THE ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007, at 42. Many believe 
these attacks emerged from civilian pro-Russian movements with 
implicit government support. Id.  
18. See Nathan Hodges, Pentagon Networks Targeted by “Hundreds of 
Thousands” of Probes (Whatever that Means), WIRED MAG. (Apr. 15, 
2010), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/pentagon-networks-
targeted-by-hundreds-of-thousands-of-probes/ (for example, the United 
States is subject to thousands of small probe attacks everyday). 
19. Id. Not all of these attacks are malicious or successful. though many are 
precursors or information gathering missions for larger attacks and need 
to be caught and managed. Id.; see also Ellen Nakashima, After 
Cyberattack on Lockheed Martin, Defense Department Sees “No 
Adverse Effect”, WASH. POST, May 29, 2011, http://www.washington 
post.com/world/national-security/after-cyberattack-on-lockheed-martin-
defense-department-sees-no-adverse-
effect/2011/05/29/AGILYOEH_story.html (demonstrating major 
internet and technology companies have all suffered cyber attacks, 
including Google, Citigroup, and others, lest one think that the 
technologically-savvy private world fares any better). 
20. Cf. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security 
Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 675, 702–03 (2004) (noting the difficulty in developing 
international consensus regarding management of new methods of 
warfare).  
21. See, e.g., Phillip A. Johnson, Is It Time for a Treaty on Information 
Warfare, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 429, 429–40 (discussing the many state calls 
for an agreement on information warfare, but that experts think such 
measures are premature); Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks 
and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99, 114 (1999) (“The novelty of a 
weapon—any weapon—always baffles statesmen and lawyers, many of 
whom are perplexed by technological innovations.”). 
516 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
The newly developing legal framework for unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) can and should guide a framework for cyberwar. 
Despite vociferous criticism,22 UAVs are fast becoming a fixture in the 
U.S. national security system.23 The Obama Administration has gone 
to great lengths to justify the use of UAVs under domestic and 
international law.24 The United States’ legal framework for UAVs 
should guide the development of the legal framework for cyberwar.  
Part II of this Note details the U.S. military’s and national 
security agencies’ development and adoption of drones and 
cyberweapons. A foundation in the myriad uses and development of 
these tools is helpful to understand the nuances of the relevant legal 
regimes. This section also provides a brief foundation in the different 
legal obligations between jus in bello and jus ad bellum scenarios. Part 
III establishes the legality of UAV espionage and why cyber espionage 
is similarly acceptable. Part IV finds the use of these new tools in 
military armed attack is acceptable, as long as the armed attack is 
otherwise lawful. Part V explores the area “in between” espionage and 
force. It evaluates the legal justifications for the use of UAVs in 
covert operations and extends this legal framework to cyberwar. In 
addition, it considers how a state might use cyberwar as a tool of 
coercion. Finally, Part VI concludes that cyberwar, like UAVs, is and 
should be part of the current military and clandestine playbook.  
There are some limitations worth mentioning. The information for 
this Note is limited to public sources. Further, the debate surrounding 
the legality of international UAV missions is far from settled.25 In 
22. Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing 
Through Drone Warfare 1 (Sept. 23, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1812124 (“The criticisms [of drones] range 
widely in their complaints. They include claims that . . . drone warfare 
‘de-humanizes’ warfare and creates a ‘Playstation’ mentality towards 
killing; targeting decisions lack transparency and legal standards, 
particularly with regard to strikes undertaken by the CIA.”). 
23. See Predators Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y. 
TIMES (last updated Sept. 26, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html 
(“[A]erial drones are transforming the way America fights and thinks 
about wars.”).  
24. See id. (summarizing the various policy statements and speeches Obama 
Administration officials have made asserting the legality of the UAV 
program).  
25. See, e.g., Sikander Ahmend Shah, War on Terrorism: Self-Defense, 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in 
Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77, 89 (2010) (for a very 
critical view of the legality of the current UAV program and arguing 
that as used in Pakistan, the United States cannot claim the UAV 
strikes are for self-defense); Richard Rosen, Drones and the U.S. Courts, 
37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5280, 5281 (2011) (noting the significant 
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addition, the current use of UAVs is predominately against non-state 
actors.26 In contrast, cyberwar is applicable and has been applied 
against both states and non-state actors.27 Finally, this Note focuses 
solely on cyberwar and does not cover issues of cybercrime or 
cyberterrorism. 
II. Background 
Counterterrorism and national security expert and former White 
House adviser Richard Clarke defines cyberwar as “actions by a 
nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for 
the purposes of causing damage or disruption.”28 Clarke’s definition 
implies cyberwar can target either computer networks or traditional 
infrastructure targets reached via computer networks. Although 
cyberwar still lacks a single, agreed-upon definition,29 Clarke’s 
definition is representative and a useful starting point for the 
development of a legal framework for cyberwar.  
An understanding of the adoption of cyberwar and UAV 
technologies by the United States is informative to the applicable 
legal framework. The use of UAVs and cyberwar should be divided in 
two ways. First, these tools are subject to different laws depending on 
whether the state is engaged in active conflict or not. Second, these 
tools can be regulated based on the intended use, whether for 
surveillance, force, or interference tactics.  
A. The Explosion of Unmanned Technologies at the Pentagon 
The first tests of unmanned vehicles occurred during World War 
I30 and UAVs emerged as reconnaissance tools during the Vietnam 
War.31 The first UAVs used as weapons were guided bombs, which 
debate over the lawfulness of the UAV program under international law 
and analyzing possible judicial remedies if the program is unlawful). 
26. See Chris Downes, ‘Targeted Killings’ in an Age of Terror: The Legality 
of the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 277, 278 (considering 
the use of UAVs in the campaign against terrorism). 
27. See James A. Lewis, Thresholds for Cyberwar 3–4 (Ctr. for Strategic 
Int’l Stud. Rep., 2010) (noting that there have been cyber campaigns 
against non-state actors, but this strategy is mostly employed against 
states or corporations where there is likely to be more significant 
impact). 
28. RICHARD CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR 6 (2010). 
29. Jeffrey Carr, What Is Cyberwar?, SLATE.COM (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2011/08/what_
is_cyberwar.html. 
30. JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED 
AERIAL SYSTEMS 1 (2012).  
31. Id. at 4.  
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gave way to larger UAVs that deliver missiles to targets.32 In the first 
Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military used a few unmanned tanks and 
a single UAV.33 Since then, technology has developed rapidly and 
UAVs have come to the forefront of military strategy.34 Today the 
military has over 7,000 UAVs—totaling one third of the air fleet—and 
has requested $5 billion for further support of the UAV program from 
Congress.35 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does not disclose 
how many UAVs are in its arsenal.36 
UAVs are a growing industry because of the relative low cost in 
both their development and operation.37 UAVs also reduce casualties 
among American forces and collateral damage because of their greater 
accuracy and precision.38 The military is exploring other uses for 
UAVs, such as refueling, air combat, search and rescue, and 
resupply.39 The current UAV fleet features vehicles that “range from 
the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner.”40 Larger UAVs 
are able to reach greater altitude, carry larger weapons, and have 
better targeting precision.41 UAVs are currently used for 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and combined target acquisition and 
precision strikes.42 The features and uses of UAVs mirror that of 
32. Id. 
33. P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Law of War, THE NEW ATLANTIS, 
Winter 2009, at 25, 28. Israel originally led the way in expansive 
exploration of this technology beginning in the 1980s. Id.  
34. Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 104–05 (2010) (noting the rapid rise of 
drones in the U.S. military fleet in just a few years).  
35. Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), supra note 23. 
36. Elisabeth Bumiller, A Day Job Waiting for a Kill Shot in a World 
Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A1 (noting that the CIA drone 
program is classified).  
37. GERTLER, supra note 30, at 2. 
38. Executive Summary and Command Brief, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 416, 418 
(2010).  
39. GERTLER, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
40. Id. at Summary. 
41. See generally U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT 
PLAN 2009-2047 (May 18, 2009), available at http://www.govexec. 
com/pdfs/072309kp1.pdf (describing present and future developments in 
small, medium, and large unmanned aircraft systems). 
42. GERTLER, supra note 30, at 4. However, in the most recent Department 
of Defense Priority Statement released in January 2012, the words 
“drone” and “unmanned aerial vehicle” do not appear anywhere. DEP’T 
OF DEFENSE, SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST 
CENTURY DEFENSE (2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/news 
/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. This is despite the obvious growing 
reliance on these tools in the war on terror, specifically in Pakistan. 
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cyberweapons; these parallels elucidate how cyberwar fits in the 
national security paradigm. 
B. The Growth of Information Operations and Computer Networks as 
Defense Strategies 
Control of information for political and strategic gain is not new. 
Manipulation of computer networks offers a new way to achieve such 
gain.43 Individuals, companies, and governments can manipulate 
computer networks to spread propaganda, collect classified 
information, or shut down major infrastructure installations.44 There 
are many methods of manipulation of computer networks. Information 
operations (IO) is a modern concept of disrupting an adversary’s 
information system while defending one’s own system.45 IO becomes 
information warfare (IW) when such actions are undertaken during 
active hostilities.46  
IO and IW are expansive terms47 and other very broad terms are 
used in the same context or with the same meaning. For example, 
Professor Matthew C. Waxman defines cyberattacks as “efforts to 
Laurie R. Blank & Benajmin R. Farley, Characterizing US Operations 
in Pakistan: Is the United States Engaged in an Armed Conflict, 34 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151, 151 (2011).  
43. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of 
Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 890 (1999) (“To the extent these 
operations, whether occurring during times of peace or armed conflict, 
intend interference with a country’s national defense by targeting 
defense premises or resources, including human and natural resources, 
they constitute ‘sabotage.’”).  
44. See id. (“Thus, Information operations would encompass, among an 
array of other activities, virtually any nonconsensual actions intended to 
discover, alter, destroy, disrupt, or transfer data stored in a computer, 
manipulated by a computer, or transmitted through a computer 
network.”). 
45. Id. 
46. See id. at 891 (“‘[I]nformation Warfare’ is often incorrectly used as a 
synonym for ‘information operations.’ In fact, IW accurately refers to 
those information operations conducted during times of crisis or conflict 
intended to effect specific results against a particular opponent. Thus, 
IW would not include information operations occurring during 
peacetime.”). 
47. See id. at 890–92 (“[C]omputer network attack cuts across many 
categories of offensive [information operations]—is [sic] intended result, 
for instance, might be deception or psychological effect. It is a 
technique, rather than a particular genre of objective. CNA operations 
can be used to facilitate strategic, operational, and tactical ends. 
Further, because physical destruction seldom results from CNA, 
decision-makers find it a particular attractive option in situations short 
of armed conflict.”).  
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alter, disrupt, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks and 
the information or programs on them.”48 These are not limited to 
state actions, as non-state actors could be involved with cyberattacks 
as well. Professor Michael N. Schmitt notes computer network attacks 
(CNA) could be stand-alone actions or used in conjunction with 
traditional activities.49 These broad terms reflect the extensive uses of 
computers in defensive and offensive national strategies.  
Relatively unsophisticated computer users are capable of CNA 
that could be classified as a cyberattack.50 DDoS attacks that disrupt 
vital communication services, like those seen in Estonia and Georgia, 
are not difficult to create.51 Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame are some of the 
most sophisticated cyberattacks known, reflecting the significant 
financial and intelligence resources the United States and Israel 
provided.52 
IO and CNA offer a variety of uses, such as spying via keystroke 
logging, data mining, or data interception.53 While still just a specter, 
the possibility of a virus that shuts down an electrical grid exists.54 
Impersonation is one of the easiest ways to access online networks; 
U.S. agents have participated in an online community of jihad 
48. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force” Under UN Charter 
Article 2(4), 87 INT’L L. STUD. 43, 43 (2011).  
49. Schmitt, supra note 43, at 890. For example, the United States 
apparently considered using a computer network attack during the 2011 
Libya intervention prior to the physical actions. Eric Schmitt & Thom 
Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks to Weaken Libya, 
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A1.  
50. See Roger W. Barnett, A Different Kettle of Fish: Computer Network 
Attacks, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 21, 22 (1999) (“The entry costs to conduct a 
strategic information attack are insignificant—an inexpensive computer, 
some easily obtainable software, and a simple connection to the 
Internet. In theory, anyone just about anywhere can gain access and 
mount an information attack that might bring about devastating 
results.”).  
51. Davis, supra note 15. 
52. Jim Finkle, Virus Found in Mideast Can Spy on Bank Transactions, 
REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/cy 
bersecurity-gauss-idINL2E8J92YD20120809.  
53. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 92 (discussing the 
possibility of logic bombs, a major concern at American national 
security agencies, which act as an “eraser” on a computer, destroying all 
information rendering the computer a “useless hunk of metal” and could 
cause catastrophic damage including destroyed electrical grids or loss of 
aircraft control systems). 
54. Id.  
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activists in order to gather information.55 Although this operation was 
mostly passive, this operation is a form of IO. 
The United States recognizes cyberspace as part of national 
defense. U.S. Cyber Command opened in 2010, as the authority on 
cyber defense and operations.56 DoD initially took a defensive 
approach to cyberspace, focusing on securing American installations 
from outside attack.57 This defensive tone has shifted to a more 
offensive tone. In 2011, the Pentagon reported to Congress that 
cyberweapons are a viable part of military action in a theater of 
active conflict.58 According to this report, “DoD will ensure that the 
U.S. military continues to have all necessary capabilities in cyberspace 
to defend the United States and its interests . . . .”59 Without 
providing details on specific capabilities, the report states: 
The Department [of Defense] has the capability to conduct 
offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and 
interests. If directed by the President, DoD will conduct offensive 
cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and 
legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, 
including the law of armed conflict.60 
The military and government’s interest in offensive capabilities of 
cyberspace grows as the tools and capabilities of cyberspace and 
computer networks expand. With this growing arsenal, understanding 
the legal consequences becomes more critical. 
55. See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 226–27 (2011); see also 
CATHERINE THEOHARY & JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41674, TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN 
CYBERSPACE 6–7 (2011) (discussing national security agencies’ efforts to 
use the internet to monitor and possibly disrupt extremists); Ellen 
Nakashima, Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Illustrates Need for Clearer 
Cyberwar Policies, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.washingto 
npost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805464.html 
(discussing the United States’ use of a cyberattack to shut down a 
website the CIA and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia created to attract 
extremists for intelligence gathering). 
56. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.strat 
com.mil/factsheets/cyber_command/ (last updated Dec. 2011). 
57. See, e.g., U.S.-COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 
(2003) (outlining steps to secure U.S. infrastructure against cyberattack, 
but not suggesting offensive options in cyberspace). 
58. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Cyber Offense Part of U.S. Strategy, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/pentagon-cyber-
offense-part-of-us-strategy/2011/11/15/gIQArEAlPN_story.html.  
59. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POLICY 
REPORT 2 (2011).  
60. Id. at 5.  
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C. The Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum Distinction 
The distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum is discussed 
extensively in scholarly works.61 These areas of law are central to any 
justification for cyberwar in international law. The jus in bello (laws 
of war) regulate actors during an active conflict.62 Before initiating a 
war, jus ad bellum (laws before war) rules apply.63  
Modern jus in bello emerged in the late nineteenth century and 
led to the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions.64 The 
Hague Conventions govern the tools of war by prohibiting certain 
weapons.65 
In comparison, the Geneva Convention and its subsequent 
protocols are the foundation for the law of war,66 governing actors in 
61. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After 
September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002) (providing overview of the 
modern thinking on these areas of international law).  
62. Id. at 905–06. 
63. Id. at 905.  
64. Brooks, supra note 20, at 688–89 (discussing the development of the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions). 
65. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter 
Hague IV]; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
19 I.L.M. 1523 (prohibiting the use of weapons that might cause injury 
by fragment but then be undetectable on x-ray, mines, booby-traps, 
“other devices,” incendiary weapons, and blinding lasers); Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 
1507 (requiring all State Parties to not use, stockpile, or develop and to 
destroy any existing anti-personnel mines); Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, May 30, 2008, 38 I.L.M. 354 (banning cluster munitions). 
The Geneva “branch” of law focuses on the actors, while the Hague 
“branch” focuses on the weapons. YVES SANDOZ, CONVENTION OF 10 
OCTOBER 1980 ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF 
CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE 
EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECT 1 (2010), 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cprccc/cprccc_e. 
pdf. In contrast, cyber tools—and drones—provide a greater range of 
choices and utility than the prohibited weapons and in fact can be used 
in a way that falls well short of force. See Waxman, supra note 48, at 47 
(exploring when cyberattacks might be classified as force and providing 
an overview of other scholarly thinking on the issue). 
66. James D. Fry, The UN Security Council and the Law of Armed 
Conflict: Amity or Enmity?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 330 
(2006). Although the United Nations Charter made aggressive war 
illegal, it did not outlaw a state of war per se, nor does not provide 
guidance of proper behavior during war. Id.  
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war.67 The Geneva Conventions and Protocols require proper 
treatment of the sick, wounded, prisoners of war, civilians, and those 
no longer engaged in hostilities.68 Together, these laws of armed 
conflict ensure protection for civilians and innocents while allowing 
states to pursue national security interests during conflict. 
Under jus ad bellum, the UN Charter Article 2(4) outlaws the use 
of force.69 But there are two narrow exceptions: a state may use force 
against another state when authorized by the UN Security Council or 
in self-defense.70 The UN Charter understands force through the 
method, not the effect, of the action.71 The prohibition on the use of 
force has evolved as an international norm due to its centrality to the 
67. E.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942) (“[T]his Court has 
recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law 
of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights 
and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”). 
68. See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.  
69. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
70. U.N. Charter art 51. (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.”).  
71. WALTER GARY SHARP, JR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 69 
(1999) (clarifying that a state becomes a party to active hostilities when 
there is a declaration of war, some sort of military occupation, or the 
sate is “engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity with 
another state that reaches the level of an armed attack,” as defined 
under the UN charter); see also Marie Jacobson, Modern Weaponry and 
Warfare: The Application of Article 36 of Additional Protocol I by 
Governments, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 183, 184 (2006) (referencing the ICRC 
Commentary’s prohibition on means of warfare and certain methods of 
warfare). 
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UN Charter.72 States support the prohibition on the use of force in 
order to protect their own interests.73 This principle still leaves open 
the question: What is force?74 New technology makes this question 
even more difficult to answer. State actions must be determined to be 
force amounting to armed attack before response force is authorized—
and many actions fall short of this threshold and are thus permitted 
under international law.  
III. Surveillance and Information Gathering 
Intelligence gathering is vital to any state, during peacetime or 
conflict.75 The 1907 Hague Convention IV recognizes spies as a regular 
part of active conflict.76 Outside of the Hague Convention, the 
international laws of war surrounding espionage largely concern the 
treatment of spies when captured.77 Yet international law does not 
expressly prohibit or allow espionage during peacetime.78 Domestic 
espionage laws are a contradiction: “[m]ost domestic legal systems . . . 
seek to prohibit intelligence gathering by foreign agents while 
protecting the state’s own capacity to conduct such activities 
abroad.”79 Under domestic law, the United States may lawfully engage 
72. Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellum, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22, 
25 (2009) (“[S]tatic jus ad bellum maintains that a state may not use 
armed force against another state unless it is defending against an 
armed attack or authorized by the Security Council to do so . . . . [n]o 
doubt there are several reasons why his particular norm as continued to 
be viewed as static.”).  
73. See id. at 26 (noting the interests of a range of international actors in 
preserving the prohibition, but discussing how powerful nations might 
act in ways that appear to be force, but justifying it under the current 
paradigm to prevent creating problematic precedent). 
74. Id. at 28. 
75. Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996) (finding that intelligence 
activities are now a regular part of the modern state’s security 
activities).  
76. Hague IV, supra note 65, art. 24. Article 24 explicitly states: “Ruses of 
war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining 
information about the enemy and the country are considered 
permissible.” Id.  
77. Demarest, supra note 75, at 335 (discussing when the classification of 
spy is applicable). 
78. Id. at 321 (noting international law applicable to espionage in times of 
peace is “virtually unstated”). 
79. Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: 
Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1072 
(2006). 
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in espionage.80 International law protects spies who are captured 
whereas domestic laws prosecute foreign spies when captured. UAVs 
and computer viruses offer an advantage in espionage because they do 
not need humanitarian protection.  
A. Flying Spies 
The United States uses UAVs for espionage.81 The UAV known as 
the Predator was frequently used for surveillance of Al-Qaeda 
operatives, because of its significantly greater accuracy than 
surveillance from typical fighter jets.82 More than ten years ago, the 
CIA was using UAVs to track Osama bin Laden.83 Small UAVs are 
also in development that are less detectable, less intrusive, and blend 
into their surroundings by mimicking insects and birds.84  
A nation targeted by reconnaissance UAVs might claim the self-
defense doctrine and respond with force. During the Cold War, Russia 
alleged that foreign planes in its airspace were spying, then classified 
this as a use of force, and attacked the planes while claiming self-
defense.85 The UN Security Council disagreed, finding the flights were 
not a use of force even though the flights violated Russian 
sovereignty.86 Similar problems may arise when using UAVs for 
reconnaissance.87  
80. Commander Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence 
Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999) 
(“[T]he United States is under no legal obligation, domestic or 
international, to refrain from engaging in espionage.”). 
81. See U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 41, at 25–26, (The U.S. military 
primarily uses three drones for surveillance missions—the Wasp III, the 
RQ-11 Raven, and the MQ-1 Predator). Other drones have been used 
for surveillance missions, but were phased out for cost reasons. 
GERTLER, supra note 30, at 11.  
82. Jane Mayer, The Predators of War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_maye
r.  
83. Id. Although the success of such tracking is still up for debate. Some 
intelligence agents believe that the supposed sightings of bin Laden were 
not accurate. Id.  
84. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves with Drones, Some 
Tiny as Bugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A1.  
85. SHARP, supra note 71, at 126.  
86. S.C. Res. 135, U.N. Doc. S/RES/135 (May 27, 1960) (urging “all 
Member Governments to . . . respect each other’s sovereignty”). 
87. See Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the 
Law of War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 
1, 13 (2011) (discussing the use of drones in Pakistan based on 
cooperative efforts between the nations and value of consent in UAV 
operations).  
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Pakistan has publicly claimed U.S. UAV missions in its airspace 
violate Pakistani sovereignty, which might give rise to a right to act 
in self-defense.88 When a reconnaissance UAV crashed in Iran due to a 
technological malfunction, Iran seized the opportunity to take the 
aircraft for further study and leveraged the capture geopolitically.89 In 
either scenario, the United States risked Pakistan or Iran responding 
to the surveillance with force. Yet, if the UAVs were attacked, the 
only loss would be expensive equipment, not human life.90  
B. Desk Jockey Spies 
Like UAVs, reconnaissance via computer networks is also covert. 
For example, a state can use a pre-installed “backdoor” to access the 
computer network of an adversarial government.91 This is the exact 
sort of operation the United States ran as part of Olympic Games, the 
United States-Israel coordinated effort to infiltrate and disrupt 
uranium enrichment in Iran. The Flame virus infiltrated and spied on 
computers in Iran for years, prior to the Stuxnet attack. The virus 
was able to “activate computer microphones and cameras, log 
keyboard strokes, take screen shots, extract geolocation data from 
images, and send and receive commands and data through Bluetooth 
wireless technology.”92 The attack was designed to lay the framework 
for later covert action. 
88. DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL 250 (2012).  
However, the two states have some cooperation in this program. 
But the United States cannot explain its [UAV] strategy. That 
silence is part of the unspoken deal with Pakistan, which wants 
to hide its episodic participation in the drone program because 
of fear of what its cooperation with the United States would 
look like to the Pakistani public. And if a strike goes bad and 
civilians are killed, the Pakistani government can deny it ever 
knew about it. 
 Id.  
89. Greg Jaffe & Thomas Erbdink, Iran Says it Downed U.S. Stealth Drone; 
Pentagon Acknowledges Aircraft Downing, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2011, at 
A21.  
90. See SANGER, supra note 88, at 148 (discussing the Obama 
Administration’s decision to do nothing when the UAV crashed in Iran, 
as this was the “safest course” for military personnel and civilian 
Iranians). Had either nation responded by attacking the United States 
on its territory, they would have violated the international principle of 
proportionality.  
91. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 59–60 (outlining the process 
and uses of “backdoors” in computer network attacks).  
92. Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 9.  
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Another option is to use malicious code that then reroutes 
information on a computer network to those who wish to see it.93 
Another example is “IP spoofing,” when a hacker pretends to be a 
legitimate website, so when users access the website they are 
unknowingly rerouted to the hacker’s fake site.94 The hacker then 
gains access to information entered by the user.95 When these actions 
do not otherwise cause kinetic damage or degrade the computer 
network in any way, they are more akin to surveillance flight than a 
use of force.96 In an active combat context, an order given by a 
commanding officer to exploit a computer network in order to acquire 
necessary information about a target or threat would be the same as 
giving the order to a person.97  
Gathering information via long-range electronic signals, 
geolocation, sensors, lasers and the other technologies is a 
longstanding part of intelligence gathering.98 With these tools states 
can avoid sending people into dangerous situations just for 
information gathering.99 Because drones and computer attacks operate 
without a person on board, these tools are safer for the spying state 
and its operatives.100  
While UAVs allow a state to target an intruding aircraft, 
computer network infiltration will be a much more elusive target. 
Even if a state can identify the actor who launched the surveillance 
93. Herbert Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 5 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 63, 65–68 (2011) (providing an overview of 
cyber espionage, beginning with finding a network vulnerability through 
exploiting the weakness to gather information or degrade the network).  
94. Farha Ali, IP Spoofing, 10 THE INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 1, 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_i 
ssues/ipj_10-4/ipj_10-4.pdf. 
95. Id. at 3. 
96. Major Arie J. Schapp, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use 
Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 139 (2009) (“These types 
of actions [cyber espionage], provided they do not disrupt, deny, 
degrade, manipulate, or destroy information resident in computers and 
computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves, should 
not be considered cyber warfare operations.”). 
97. Id. at 140 (establishing that espionage is a typical part of state activities 
during conflict, regardless of the means employed to gather intelligence). 
98. THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 350–51 (2000). 
99. Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, 
and the Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 653 (2009) (listing 
the array of uses of UAVs, sans human operator, by the U.S. military). 
100. Cf. id. (noting there is no person at risk if a UAV is captured; similarly, 
a computer virus cannot be caputred). 
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computer attack, it may take months or years to do so.101 When one 
state hacks into the computer system of another, it violates the target 
state’s domestic laws.102 However, because the use of aircraft for 
reconnaissance is not force, the use of computer networks to infiltrate 
another state should not be considered force.103  
States may resort to some self-defense measures more quickly if 
subject to computer espionage. Because of the speed with which 
computer espionage can escalate to computer attack, a targeted state 
may rightfully resort to self-defense in order to protect state secrets or 
infrastructure.104 While a plane or UAV has to reach its target pre-
armed with a missile to inflict damage, an intentional change or 
simple mistake in computer coding can completely change the effects 
of the infiltration.105 States may not be able to capture computer 
spies, but they can defend against such incursions or surveillance.106  
C. Cooperation Among States in Espionage Efforts 
Similar to asking a state for permission to use airspace, a state 
may ask for permission to use another state’s cyberspace, though 
private corporations own the computer networks and systems that 
make up cyberspace.107 Terrorists use the internet to communicate 
and organize attacks.108 The details of these plans are not written in 
101. See, e.g., Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 9 (noting nations finally 
identified Flame as the predecessor of Stuxnet, but only years after the 
original attack was launched and years after Stuxnet was identified).  
102. SHARP, supra note 71, at 127–28. 
103. Id. at 127–29. 
104. Id. at 129. Before responding in self-defense, a nation would need to 
properly attribute the attack to another state actor, which is extremely 
difficult in cyberspace. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense Against 
Computer Network Attack, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 122, 138 (1999).  
105. See SANGER, supra note 88, at 204–05 (describing the likely scenario in 
which Stuxnet was released “into the wild” accidentally).  
106. See generally Waxman, supra note 48, 50–51 (noting the right to self-
defense against cyber attacks, assuming the targeted nation can identify 
the perpetrator of the attack). 
107. George K. Walker, Neutrality and Information Warfare, 76 INT’L L. 
STUD. 233, 235–37 (2002) (discussing the validity of attacking privately 
owned communications lines during conflict). A neutral party is 
obligated to deny belligerents access to the neutral territory or 
resources. This can mean the neutral party has to actively mobilize to 
prevent belligerent access. In cyberspace, this means a service provider 
must use the technology available to it to prevent hackers, belligerent 
governments, or cyber terrorists from manipulating a neutral computer 
network. Id.  
108. THEOHARY & ROLLINS, supra note 55, at 2. 
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plain language for all to read.109 A state can ask permission to monitor 
the computer networks that host these websites to gain more reliable 
information regarding the whereabouts of terrorists. By asking for 
permission prior to such monitoring, the state respects sovereignty 
and promotes good faith.  
Information gathering is not illegal in most situations. What is 
illegal is mistreatment of agents of states engaged in information 
gathering.110 Not all states can be trusted to observe these 
international laws,111 so the use of non-human tools like UAVs and 
computer network infiltration afford a safer alternative to achieve a 
legitimate objective.  
IV. Cyberwar and UAV Missions Amounting to Force 
Cyberwar and UAVs are valid tools to exert military force. As 
long as the military force follows the applicable laws of war, then a 
state may use these new technologies.112 The “issues surrounding use, 
targeting, and collateral damage are no different” with new 
technology as compared to any other weapons system.113 It has long 
been the goal of states to find the most technologically advanced way 
to conduct hostilities in order to protect itself.114 
109. Id. 
110. See Chesterman, supra note 79, at 1078 (“From around the time of the 
U.S. Civil War, traditional rules were supplemented by an unusual and 
quite literal escape clause: if caught in the act of espionage, spies were 
subject to grave punishment, but if they managed to return to their 
armies before being captured, they were entitled treatment as prisoners 
of war and were immune from penalties meted out to spies.”). 
111. See id. (noting caputured spies are often subject to “grave 
punishment”).  
112. See Kenneth Anderson, ‘Drones II’: Testimony Submitted to the U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 3 
(American University WCL Research Paper No. 2011-26, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619819 (“[T]he fundamental 
question of drone warfare is not really the technological platform, but 
instead where and who operates it.”). 
113. Id. 
114. David Bell, In Defense of Drones: A Historical Argument, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/100113 
/obama-military-foreign-policy-technology-drones.  
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A. In Conjunction with a Traditional Armed Attack 
Today, UAVs are a major component of active conflicts in the 
U.S. military.115 UAVs were previously used in Afghanistan and are 
now mostly used in Pakistan as part of the war on terror against Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban.116 Controversy over UAV strikes continues to 
spark debate over the propriety of using force more than ten years 
after the original Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
in 2001.117 Critics complain UAVs are not a legitimate means of 
conducting battle, because the human actors avoid the realities of 
war.118 However, this characterization ignores the previous 
developments in long-range weaponry119 and the realities of UAV 
operation.120  
First, given the accuracy of UAVs, they are safer for the user and 
in line with the interests of international humanitarian law because 
UAVs are one of the most precise weapons available.121 There are a 
115. Anderson, supra note 22, at 8 (noticing military commanders are often 
“mystified” by the controversy over UAVs in active battle as these are 
another tool, just like aerial bombings or long distance missiles).  
116. Larson & Malamud, supra note 87, at 13. UAVs are also currently in 
use in Yemen and Somalia against Al-Qaeda. Drones, Computers New 
Weapons of US Shadow Wars, USA TODAY, June 12, 2012, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-06-17/drones-
computers-weapons-us-wars/55645786/1. 
117. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional 
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2052 
(2005) (“The difficult issue is determining what Congress has implicitly 
authorized [under the AUMF].”).  
118. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 7 (“[T]argeted killing and drone warfare 
need to be differentiated . . . [drones are] simply an alternative air 
platform for doing what otherwise might be done with helicopters, fixed 
wing aircraft, or ground attack in the course of conventional 
counterinsurgency operations.”); Bumiller, supra note 36 (describing the 
different responsibilities of a fighter jet pilot and a UAV pilot).  
119. See Mark Clayton, The New Cyber Arms Race, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/20 
11/0307/The-new-cyber-arms-race.  
120. See generally Bumiller, supra note 36 (noting the psychological strains 
on UAV pilots).  
121. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 8 (classifying drones as a legitimate tool 
in bello). Air Force Retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula said “‘Statistically 
over 95 percent of all the weapons released by the predator hit exactly 
what they’re aimed for,’ . . . those that fall into the other 5 percent…are 
either caused by ‘some mechanical malfunction or a last-minute 
movement of the target location.’” Jackie Northam, Popularity of 
Drones Takes Off for Many Countries, NPR (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/11/137710942/popularity-of-drones-takes-
off-for-many-countries.  
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host of justifications for the continuing use of UAVs in Pakistan, such 
as consent and self-defense.122 So long as there exists a valid use of 
force or claim of self-defense, drones fall within the arsenal of viable 
military tools.123  
Second, UAV pilots have expressed offense at the characterization 
of their work as a mere video game and describe the realities of their 
work as more emotionally draining than flying fighter jets.124 UAV 
pilots follow their targets for weeks and “observe the habits of a 
militant as he plays with his children, talks to his wife and visits his 
neighbors. They then try to time their strike when, for example, his 
family is out at the market.”125 UAV pilots are more intimately 
familiar with their targets than pilots of traditional jets. After 
executing orders and firing on a target, the UAV pilot then has the 
added stress of stepping out into the suburbs of his American home 
and trying to lead a civilian life.126 Although many decry the use of 
UAVs, the tool itself, simply by virtue of being a new technology, is 
not illegitimate.  
Like UAVs, cyberwar should be regarded as a valid military 
tool.127 The use of cyberwar is simply another evolution of technology 
on the battlefield. In active combat, a cyberattack can create kinetic 
damage similar to or substantially the same as traditional modes of 
force. Because such an attack creates kinetic damage, it falls under 
the paradigm of the laws of war, which look to the action to 
determine whether force was used, not the result.128 The use of a 
cyberattack amounting to force in conjunction with an otherwise 
lawful traditional attack would be unlikely to raise any legal 
questions.129 For example, former General Counsel to the CIA and the 
National Security Agency, Daniel B. Silver stated: “If, as may have 
122. Larson & Malamud, supra note 87, at 13.  
123. However, some of the debate stems from the split use of UAVs between 
the military and the CIA. Id. at 12.  
124. See Bumiller, supra note 36 (explaining the emotional challenges facing 
UAV pilots).  
125. Id.  
126. Id.  
127. Although, some officials have warned it is easy to “fall in love with a 
whiz-bang new technology, because it is easy to justify relying on it 
more and more. And that’s when a tactical weapon can begin defining 
your strategy.” SANGER, supra note 88, at 244 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
128. See Geneva Conventions and Protocols, supra note 68 and 
accompanying text.  
129. See Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 73, 79 
(2002). 
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been the case in the Kosava conflict [computer network attack] is 
used in the context of military operation conducted by traditional 
means that indubitably constitute force, the target State would have 
little interest in raising a legal dispute on the sole issue of [computer 
network attack].”130 In that situation, Serbia’s only basis to claim this 
attack was unlawful would be to claim the entire operation was 
unlawful, not just the cyber component.131  
Military use of cyberwar, as part of a lawful, active combat 
scenario still must conform to the rules of the battlefield.132 The laws 
of war will constrain the use of computer attacks. For example, the 
principle of distinction, which dictates that care be taken to avoid 
harming the civilian population, still applies and a computer attack 
must be limited to legitimate military targets.133 A state utilizing 
computer attacks must also avoid collateral damage and take 
necessary precautions to protect neutral parties and civilians.134 In 
addition, military actions must be necessary and conducted with a 
level of force proportional to the mission at hand.135 With observation 
of the principles of jus in bello, “a computer network that is tailored 
130. Id. 
131. Id. A cyberattack was also on the table prior to invading Iraq in the 
First Gulf War. Given that this intervention as a matter of armed force 
was lawful, the potential use of cyberattack prior to invasion to protect 
the incoming air strike would have been a permissible tactic. Ultimately 
this strategy was not used because it was thought to be too risky at the 
time, requiring a person to cross enemy lines to unleash the cyberattack, 
instead of acting remotely. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 8–9.  
132. Knut Dörmann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer 
Networks Attacks 2 (2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other 
/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf (“[T]he fact that a particular military 
activity constituting a method of warfare is not specifically regulated, 
does not mean that it can be used without restriction.”). 
133. See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, Some Thoughts on Computer 
Network Attack and the International Law of Armed Conflict, 76 INT’L 
L. STUD. 163, 165–69 (2002) (discussing the development of the principle 
of distinction in international law, including the prohibition on 
indiscriminate attacks, and necessity of proper precautions and efforts to 
avoid collateral damage regardless of the weapon being used). 
134. See generally id. at 169–72 (discussing proper methods to avoid 
collateral damage).  
135. James H. Doyle, Jr. Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military 
Operations, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 147, 156 (2002). There is no requirement 
that the defending nation only use force identical to that threatened. In 
fact, they may use disproportionately more force than that threatened in 
order to ensure an efficient and decisive victory. The proportionality is 
measured against the goal to be achieved. So, if a computer network 
attack is the best strategy to prevent a significant attack, it is 
justifiable. Id.  
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to produce limited physical consequences may prove to be an effective 
non-lethal tool of warfare.”136  
B. As a Precursor to Armed Attack 
UAVs and cyberwar fit clearly into the military arsenal during 
armed attack. If UAVs strike a nation, causing kinetic damage, there 
has clearly been an armed attack triggering the targeted state’s right 
to self-defense. It is more difficult to determine when cyberwar used 
as outside of full-scale conflict becomes the flashpoint for a full-scale 
conflict.137  
If a state uses a UAV to enter a sovereign state and drop a 
missile without provocation or self-defense, such action is an armed 
attack.138 Military UAVs are identifiable and attributable.139 Although 
approximately fifty states are developing their own UAV fleets, it is 
no secret that the United States is managing both the official military 
and the covert CIA operations in Pakistan.140 Even if UAV use 
becomes more ubiquitous, if a UAV attack is launched, the targeted 
nation will likely be able to identify the perpetrator and respond.  
Cyberattacks on the other hand, are notoriously anonymous, often 
making attribution difficult if not impossible.141 Even assuming that 
attribution is possible and completed quickly enough to justify action, 
it is not always clear when a cyberattack constitutes use of force, 
justifying self-defense.142 The National Research Council promotes an 
136. Id. at 157. 
137. See Dörmann, supra note 132, at 2 (“The most difficult situation, as far 
as applicability of [international humanitarian law] is concerned, would 
be the one where the first, or the only ‘hostile’ acts are conducted by 
CNA.”). 
138. See Blank & Farley, supra note 42, at 153 (suggesting the current use of 
UAVs may exceed the authorized use of force and therefore might not 
justified be justified under international law). 
139. See Northam, supra note 121 (noting the use of UAVs for a variety of 
strategies is becoming “ubiquitous” around the world). 
140. Id. 
141. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 22 (“Now nameless, faceless actors can 
potentially attain strategic objective; and the possibility exists of not 
being able to identify the perpetrators and hold them accountable.”). 
142. See Doyle, supra note 135, at 151. There is little public information 
about U.S. government, or any government, attribution efforts regarding 
cyberattacks by state actors. However, a comparison with the more 
public efforts surrounding attribution in cyberterrorism is apt. For 
example, the hacker group “Anonymous” has graced headlines recently, 
for their significant attacks on major organizations, including national 
governments, Interpol and Facebook. It has been extremely difficult to 
pinpoint the origin of the attacks to either stop them or arrest the 
actors. Ashley Fantz, Who Is Anonymous? Everyone and No One, CNN 
534 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
effects-based understanding to determine when cyberattack amounts 
to a use of force under Article 2(4), stating “if a cyberattack would 
have the same effects as certain governmentally initiated 
coercive/harmful actions that are traditionally and generally not 
treated as the ‘use of force’ (e.g., economic sanctions, espionage, or 
certain covert actions), such a cyberattack should also not be 
regarded as a use of force.”143 Several factors—severity, immediacy, 
directness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy—
help define when an attack falls short of force.144  
For example, in 2007 Israel bombed an alleged North Korean 
nuclear reactor located in Syria.145 The bombing was undoubtedly a 
use of force. Syria was unaware of the impending attack, because the 
Israeli Air Force had tricked the defensive radar.146 Israel used a spoof 
attack to deceive Syrian air-defense radars, “first making it appear 
that no jets were in the sky and then in an instant making the radar 
believe the sky was filled with hundreds of planes.”147 While the 
bombing was certainly force, did the spoof attack, which facilitated 
the bombing, amount to force? It seems unlikely, as the spoof attack 
did not create kinetic damage. Had Syria noticed the CNA before the 
bombing, any use of force as self-defense would have been a 
disproportionate response, unless Syria could directly connect the 
CNA to the traditional bombing that followed.148  
Feb. 9, 2012 http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-09/world/world_anony 
mous-explainer_1_chat-room-internet-caf-anonymous-members?_s=P 
M:WORLD; see also Hilary Whiteman, Interpol Arrests Suspected 
‘Anonymous’ Hackers, CNN (Feb. 29, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/ 
2012-02-29/world/world_europe_anonymous-arrests-hacking_1_ddos-
hacking-group-denial-of-service-attacks?_s=PM:EUROPE; Doug Gross, 
Hacker Group Vows to ‘Kill Facebook’, CNN (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-09/tech/anonymous.facebook_1_fa 
cebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-denial-of-service-attacks-user?_s=PM:TE 
CH. 
143. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 
REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 
34 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009). 
144. See Schmitt, supra note 43, at 914–15 (listing the determinative factors 
to distinguish armed force from other forms of coercion).  
145. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 1–3. 
146. See id. at 5. 
147. Eli Lake, Israel’s Secret Iran Attack Plan: Electronic Warfare, THE 
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:28 PM), http://www.thedailybeast 
.com/articles/2011/11/16/israel-s-secret-iran-attack-plan-electronic-
warfare.print.html. 
148. Additionally, different nations might have different views on what 
constitutes force. See Waxman, supra note 48, at 46 (describing 
developing nations’ preference for a more expansive view of force, not 
limited to armed attack).  
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If a state uses CNA to disrupt another state’s communication or 
defense services prior to armed attack, the CNA alone would not give 
the targeted state a right to respond with force. However, if the 
targeted nation can persuasively link a CNA to impending armed 
attack or demonstrate the CNA to be significant enough, it might 
have grounds to claim the armed attack began in the computer 
network, not on ground.  
V. Cyberattacks as an Interference Tactic 
Some operations cause inconvenience or interference with an 
adversary’s operations, and thus fall short of “force” under the UN 
Charter.149 For example, a state might provide subversive propaganda 
to foment rebellion among civilians of another state in order to 
further its objectives.150 With modern IO, a government can use social 
networking or online news outlets to promote certain policies or 
objectives among civilian populations abroad.151 Modern technology 
provides a more efficient means to achieve ends usually accomplished 
via military action.152 The ease of hiding behind the computer network 
encourages the growth of clandestine activities.153  
149. See Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 138, 156 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitt, War, 
Technolgy and the Law of Armed Conflict] (“Mere inconvenience would 
not [constitute armed attack].”).  
150. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United States, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 
990 (1974) [hereinafter Nonviolent Coercion]. “[States] can occupy an 
intermediate status between . . . extremes and seek to influence each 
other by intermediate forms of coercion—that is, by nonamicable 
measures short of war.” Id.  
151. In a less covert example, Voice of America (VOA) radio and television 
programming seeks to do exactly this. Currently, the United States 
produces an Iranian version of Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show, called 
Parazit, featuring two Iranian comedians mocking the current Iranian 
regime and broadcasts the show into Iran on VOA. Although the 
success of the program is difficult to measure, it is a direct line into 
Iranian homes. SANGER, supra note 88, at 214–19. Computer networks 
allow for similar spreading of information, but do so more covertly.  
152. See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public 
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 284 (1996) (“[A]ttacking an 
enemy’s information networks may go beyond incapacitating its armed 
forces; it may serve as the best means of achieving victory.”). Here, the 
drone analogy is not entirely appropriate as the use of drones falls is 
squarely an armed attack. Cyberwar on the other hand offers much 
greater opportunity for force short of armed attack so it is well worth an 
analysis outside of the drone analogy. 
153. See John Sifton, A Brief History of Drones, THE NATION (Feb. 27, 
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones 
(“Drones crossed into a new frontier in military affairs: an area of 
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Currently, the United States operation of UAVs is growing not 
just in the military branches, but also the CIA.154 The justifications 
for the greater role of the Executive Branch in overseas operations of 
UAVs are instructive to the possible overseas use of computer 
network attacks by the same.155 The legality of the non-military use of 
UAVs is still hotly debated.156 Even with this uncertainty, the 
explanation for the use of UAVs can shed light on a possible 
justification for the use of covert CNA.  
A. Cyberwar as a Non-Covert Use of Force Not Amounting to Armed 
Attack 
Although non-intervention is one of the central tenants of 
international law, this principle is flexible.157 A state may use force, 
without rising to the level of armed attack, and the targeted state will 
not be legally permitted to respond with force.158 Attempts at coercion 
are a part of international geopolitics, to encourage compliance, 
agreement, and acquiescence between states.159 In such situations, 
cyberwar finds a very appropriate role. Many cyberattacks are not 
entirely risk-free, remote and even potentially automated killing 
detached from human behavioral cues.”). 
154. Id. 
155. One of the frequent criticisms is of the Executive’s unilateral use of 
UAVs through CIA covert actions. Congress has begun to stake out a 
greater role for itself with greater oversight of the covert CIA UAV 
program. Ken Dilanian, Congress Zooms in on Drone Killings, L.A. 
TIMES, June 25, 2012, at 1. 
156. See Blank & Farley, supra note 42, at 153 (disucssing whether the 
United States is involved in legal self-defense responses or is engaging in 
unlawful armed conflict). 
157. See Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 545 
(2007).  
One of the fundamental tenets of international law is, of course, 
that one state not intervene in the internal affairs of another 
state. It may be a fundamental principle, but it is also fairly 
tattered. States seek to influence each other daily. Sometimes 
this is done by economic sanctions, or by international political 
pressure. Most of that activity is clearly legal, although the state 
that is the target of the efforts almost always says that it is not. 
 Id.  
158. See Brian T. O’Donnell & James C. Kraska, International Law of 
Armed Conflict and Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of 
Engagement, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 395, 398 (2002) (“Some scholars 
maintain that a CNA constitutes a use of force, whereas other scholars 
maintain that CNA is much more akin to adverse nonforceable 
influence.”).  
159. See generally Nonviolent Coercion, supra note 150 (discussing how and 
when coercion may be used and in what forms it might take). 
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armed attack,160 and while invasive, merely amount to coercion or 
interference and are therefore lawful.  
There is a history of coercive actions by states and international 
organizations to induce a change of behavior among states thought to 
be in the wrong. For example, the UN Security Council is authorized 
to place sanctions and other measures on states not in compliance 
with the Charter.161 The United Nations has used sanctions to 
discourage development of weapons and weaken authoritarian 
regimes.162 
Outside of multilateral actions, states engage in “low intensity 
conflicts” both domestically and abroad as a manner of quashing 
insurrection or other lawlessness.163 Military or law enforcement may 
conduct such operations.164 The purpose of these actions is to improve 
security while providing necessary aid in a localized manner.165 
Counterinsurgency efforts typify this type of action. 
Counterinsurgency fighting is often localized and does not amount to 
an armed attack.166 These multi- and unilateral operations are 
conducted with traditional tools of the military, but the new tools of 
cyberspace should play a role.  
Cyberspace will be a major center of low-intensity conflicts, 
characterizing counterinsurgency efforts. “Operating below both the 
focus of defensive schemes, as well as the legal threshold of States’ 
authority to respond with force, low-intensity cyberattacks may prove 
160. See O’Donnell & Kraska, supra note 158, at 398–99 (discussing the 
range of viable computer network attacks).  
161. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”).  
162. Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of 
Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
201, 214–15 (1994). 
163. Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and “Expanding Bullets: Limited 
Law Enforcement Exceptions or Unwarranted Handcuffs?, 82 INT’L L. 
STUD. 193, 203 (2006) (noting militaries often acts within domestic 
borders to assist in law enforcement or internal security efforts).  
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 204 (acknowledging that military forces can be used in both 
international armed combat and in a domestic law enforcement 
capacity). 
166. See Samuel Liles, Cyberwarfare: As a Form of Low-Intensity Conflict 
and Insurgency, CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, PROCEEDINGS 2010, 
47, 49 (2010) (observing that insurgency conflict has become central to 
current national security interests and applying the counterinsurgency 
legal framework to cyberwar). 
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to be a future attack strategy of choice in cyberspace.”167 A computer 
attack can be force without amounting to armed attack and therefore 
the targeted state may not respond with force.168 Such low-intensity 
attacks provide the benefits keeping the attacker anonymous and 
protected, while “be[ing] effective to retard a target’s economic, social, 
and technological development.”169 The Stuxnet worm is a perfect 
example. The worm effectively delayed Iranian development of 
weapons-grade nuclear material, and Iran was unable to conclusively 
identify the source of the attack or classify Stuxnet as armed 
attack.170  
In comparing low-intensity attacks to counterinsurgency efforts, it 
is important to balance political objectives and technical objectives.171 
Both engagements require precision and very careful targeting; 
valuing quality of impact over quantity.172 The sophistication afforded 
by such highly technical attacks helps to uphold international 
humanitarian principles by avoiding indiscriminate destruction.173  
When using coercion or interference, a state must be sure not to 
take the action too far. In one of the most tragic examples of 
sanctions, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq designed to 
stop Iraq’s development of nuclear weapons.174 These sanctions made 
167. Sean Watts, Self-Defense and Computer Network Attack, 87 INT’L L. 
STUD. 59, 60 (2011). Watts also notes the risk of this tactic. He warns 
that gaps in the law might leave states with little choice if such attack 
is used, because they will not have the right to self-defense, since the 
action will fall short of force. Also, it opens up the universe of possible 
actors to non-state actors. Id. at 61. 
168. Id. at 67 (“Only armed attack frees a state from the prohibition on the 
use of force.”).  
169. Id. at 73.  
170. Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 9. In fact the Obama 
Administration was seeking to do exactly this—interfere with Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment program without using armed attack. “The idea was 
not only to slow Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium; it was to 
mess with iran’s best scientific and military minds.” SANGER, supra note 
88, at 199.  
171. Liles, supra note 166, at 53(noting elements such as population, 
adversary, and terrain have different effects on the political and 
technical objectives). 
172. See id. (observing the difficulty in achieving a meaningful attack that 
would target a large number of computers).  
173. This is also one of the arguments promoted for the use of UAV attacks, 
as the UAVS are much more accurate than traditional bombs or 
missiles. See supra notes 38 and 118 and accompanying text.  
174. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
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exceptions for humanitarian aid, including medicine and food.175 
However, due to complicated issues and the lengthy duration of the 
administration of the sanctions regime, there was “shocking and 
extreme harm” among the civilian population.176  
Cyberweapons can create a similar disaster. A simple error in 
computer code can destroy vital public services for an entire state, 
putting public safety and welfare at risk.177 In addition, specific 
context is very important. When Estonia was attacked, its near 
complete reliance on the internet for daily services ensured significant 
damage and impact on every citizen.178 Such an attack on a less wired 
state might specifically target a despotic oligarchy and thus might be 
a viable objective.179 In a less wired state, an attack would only reach 
the upper levels of a government that can afford highly connected 
computer networks and leave the innocent civilians who do not rely 
on computer networks unharmed. While the advantages of low-
intensity attacks are great, the risks must not be ignored and each 
situation must be evaluated carefully on its own facts.180  
175. Id.; see also Joy Gordon, When Intent Makes All the Difference in the 
World: Economic Sanctions on Iraq and the Accusation of Genocide, 5 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 57, 71 (2002) (describing how sanctions 
affected humanitarian aid in Iraq). 
176. See Gordon, supra note 175, at 71 (“The result has been large-scale and 
long-term damage to every aspect of life in Iraq—for all except the very 
wealthy, and the political and military elite—with severe damage to 
education, health care, and employment . . . .”). Estimates of death 
tolls, disease rates, and infrastructure damage varied. A UN coordinator 
of humanitarian aid in Iraq during sanctions resigned and became an 
outspoken critic against the sanctions, due to the massive suffering 
caused. See Michael Powell, The Deaths He Cannot Sanction, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 17, 1998), http://www.public.asu.edu/~wellsda/foreignpolicy 
/Halliday-criticizes-sanctions.html. This was a very complicated 
international problem that has been the focus a great deal of news 
coverage and legal scholarship, which is outside the scope of this Note.  
177. A lesser version of this happened with Stuxnet. Stuxnet was not 
supposed to “enter the wild” but stay confined to the Iranian 
enrichment facilities. Nonetheless, the worm escaped, exposing 
unintended targets and the covert operation. SANGER, supra note 88, at 
206–05.  
178. Davis, supra note 15.  
179. See Sean Watts, Low Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-
Defense, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 59, 73 (2011) (“Low-visibility, low-intensity 
CNA may be effective to retard a target’s economic, social and 
technological development.”).  
180. Id. 77–78 (“CNA render geography largely meaningless. States 
previously insulated from armed attack by distance or terrain enjoy no 
such benefits in cyberspace. Borders and neighbors do not determine 
one’s cyber security. Rather, in an ironic sense, susceptibility to attack 
may be a function of the extent to which a State relies on the very 
information technology that is targeted.”). 
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B. Cyberwar in Covert Operations 
In the United States, the military and CIA operate UAVs.181 The 
CIA operates under “title 50” authority.182 Title 50, the National 
Security Act, defines covert action as, “an activity or activities of the 
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military 
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United 
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly . . . 
.”183 The United States further authorizes covert actions under 
Executive Order 12,333, which makes covert actions the exclusive 
domain of the CIA.184 
Like espionage and coercive actions, some covert actions are 
probably legal under international law.185 However, international law 
restrains covert actions as it does overt actions, based on principles of 
sovereignty, proportionality and discrimination.186 Covert actions 
particularly challenge the principle of attribution.187 By definition a 
covert action should be non-attributable. Whether the covert action is 
181. See Peter W. Singer, Op-Ed, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at SR5. Singer provides an overview of war powers 
and the authority of the Executive versus Congress in times of war. 
Singer is somewhat skeptical of some of the covert UAV strikes operated 
by the CIA, but not of the technology generally. Id. 
182. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).  
183. 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (2006). Intelligence gathering and surveillance is not 
considered a covert action. Id.  
184. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1982) (“[T]he CIA shall . . . [c]onduct 
special activities approved by the President. No agency except the CIA . 
. . may conduct any special activity unless the President determines 
that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.”); 
see also Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, 
Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 
1169–70 (2011) (finding the E.O. 12,333 to provide the CIA with covert 
authority and that it was subsequently codified in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act).  
185. See Smith, supra note 157, at 545 (“So, if espionage activities—that is 
to say the collection of intelligence—are consistent with, or at least 
tolerated by, international law, what activities are prohibited?”).  
186. See Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence 
Gathering, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 687, 693 (2007). The logical extension of 
this responsibility is that no covert action could possibly be legal in 
international law. Id. This is a highly debated point of international law, 
and this Note assumes that in at least some cases covert actions are 
legal in arguendo.  
187. See id. at 695 (stating that covert actions are often not attributable to 
the state because they are carried out by private actors). 
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to influence political discourse or bomb a target without detection, 
the goal of any action is to avoid detection.188 
The CIA’s UAV campaign in Pakistan is covert force. These 
strikes are attributable to the United States based on circumstantial 
evidence, not traditional means such as state admission of 
responsibility.189 The CIA and Obama Administration (to the extent 
either admits to conducting the strikes) justify these strikes under 
similar laws as the military justification for UAV use prior to 
combat.190  
The United States also justifies CIA UAVs based on self-
defense.191 At a public speech at the American Society of International 
Law, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State Harold Koh said, 
“it is the considered view of [the Obama] Administration . . . that 
U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with 
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, 
including the laws of war.”192 Mr. Koh explained that the use of UAVs 
is acceptable both as acts of self-defense and under the Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force Congress passed after 9/11.193 These 
operations are also conducted under the authority of Executive Order 
12,333.194 The United States contextualizes the UAV actions as part 
188. For example, during the Cold War, the United States used covert 
actions to combat Russian power. In Italy, the CIA used a covert 
political organizing program to prevent the Russian Communist party 
from gaining traction internationally. A. John Radsan, An Overt Turn 
on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 492 (2009). These efforts 
were made with Italian cooperation. Id. at 493. Other campaigns have 
involved more violent and direct influence, including overthrowing 
regimes in Iran and Nicaragua. Id. at 500. Such actions and direct 
involvement are more heavily debated and likely less in favor, especially 
among the international community. Id. at 501. 
189. See Julian E. Barnes, Panetta Makes Crack About Not-So-Secret CIA 
Drone Program, WALL ST. J., WASHINGTON WIRE (Oct. 7, 2011, 12:32 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/panetta-makes-cracks-
about-not-so-secret-cia-drone-program/. Although, the covert UAV 
program is probably one of the “worst kept secrets,” jokes former CIA 
director and now Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Id.  
190. See A. John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: 
Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1229 
(2011).  
191. Harold Koh, Dep’t of State Legal Adviser, Keynote Address: The 
Obama Administration and International Law, in 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 207, 219–20 (2010). 
192. Id. at 218.  
193. Id. at 218–19.  
194. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1982); see also A. John Radsan, An 
Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 528 (2009) 
(describing the special authority under E.O. 12,333, including that the 
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of an armed conflict with belligerent terrorist organizations, justifying 
the use of force as self-defense.195  
Like the UAV program, the United States can conduct CNA 
without taking credit. The United States might use a firewall to keep 
out undesirable information or infiltrate a network to provide 
favorable information to civilians in a targeted state.196 Such actions 
might violate the laws of neutrality by inserting the United States 
into conflicts or situations it otherwise has no immediate stake in.197 
Computer networks offer much more nuanced forms of influence than 
UAVs.  
UAVs present the same challenge when entering a state. The 
United States is not engaged in a conflict by traditional definition, 
but the United States still views the UAV campaigns to be legal.198 As 
long as a covert cyberattack conforms to the rigors of international 
humanitarian principles, the United States can justify such actions. 
When covert cyber actions distinguish between civilians and military 
and do not cause unnecessary suffering, they can be justified in the 
same manner as traditional covert tools.199 Recourse by targeted 
states against these actions should be classified by the covert nature 
of the attack, not the cyber methods.  
VI. Conclusion 
Technology is advancing faster than ever and states around the 
world have taken notice.200 When any new technology emerges, many 
may rush to seek a new regulation scheme. But the “evolutionary 
flexibility” of the laws of armed conflict is specifically designed to 
White House can pick who needs to be part of a decision to operate 
under this authority and that E.O. 12,333 are not necessarily 
intelligence operations requiring CIA participation).  
195. See Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo, Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat 
Terrorism, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 217, 228 (2011) (remarking that arguments 
against the use of UAVs “incorrectly assume that the United States is 
not engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the targeted 
terrorist groups do not pose an imminent and continuing threat to the 
United States . . . .”). 
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allow for developments in technology.201 These laws exist for the 
protection of civilians during conflict—a goal and mission that does 
not change with the methods of warfare employed.202  
A rush to impose new legal obligations just because the 
technology is new is counterproductive.203 The principles of 
humanitarian protection remain immutable and the laws of war 
continue to protect, despite advancing technologies. New technologies 
present new opportunities to meet the pressing asymmetric challenges 
of modern warfare.204 The specter of cyberwar looms large. Yet with 
exploration of the technology and law, cyberwar does not need to 
strike fear into the hearts of average citizens. As with centuries of 
conflict, from the battering ram to the warship to computer network 
attack, the modern laws of war will serve as a practical framework for 
national security.  
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